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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
James M. McCauley*
Michael L. Rigsby**
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE VIRGINIA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
On October 18, 1996, the Virginia State Bar Council (Coun-
cil) approved a change in the format of the Code of Professional
Responsibility' (Code) from canons, disciplinary rules, and ethi-
cal considerations to the Model Rules of the American Bar
Association (Model Rules).' The first twenty-one rules, Model
Rules 1.1 through 2.5, were approved in substance with some
amendments at the Council's meeting on June 19, 1997. This
approval represents approximately one-third of the conversion
from the Code to the Model Rules. The second installment of
the conversion was approved by Council at its October 1997
meeting. Notwithstanding Council's approval of this major un-
dertaking, the adoption of the Model Rules will require the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
* Ethics Counsel, Virginia State Bar. B-, 1978, James Madison University;
J.D., 1982, University of Richmond School of Law. Mr. McCauley frequently lectures
at Continuing Legal Education classes on matters involving legal ethics, lawyer adver-
tising and the unauthorized practice of law and is also an adjunct professor at J.
Sargeant Reynolds Community College in Richmond, Virginia.
** B.S., 1967, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, J.D., 1969,
University of Richmond School of Law. Mr. Rigsby served as Bar Counsel for the Vi r-
ginia State Bar from 1977 to 1997 and now practices law with the firm of Midkiff &
Hiner, P.C. He is also an adjunct professor of law at the University of Richmond
teaching professional responsibility.
1. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § ]I (Repl. Vol. 1997).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT (1987).
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B. Advertising and Solicitation
Members of the Bar frequently complain about the advertis-
ing of other lawyers. A problem arises because advertising in-
volves issues of commercial free speech, which can be restricted
by the state only in limited circumstances.3 As stated by the
Virginia State Bar's Special Committee to Monitor Advertising
and Solicitation in its Report to the Council in 1991:
1. Any regulation of lawyer advertising must be mea-
sured against the constitutional standard which permits
absolute prohibition only of that advertising which is false,
misleading or deceptive.
2. Lawyer advertising that does not in some manner
achieve the end of providing information to the consumer
may, and should, be regulated.
3. Lawyers who are advertising need guidance from the
Supreme Court of Virginia with respect to what forms of
advertising are considered false or misleading and what are
considered safe harbors that will avoid the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions.4
In an effort to monitor lawyers' increasing use of telephone
directory and electronic media advertising, a special committee
recommended, and the Council and the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia ultimately approved, the creation of a standing committee
to review advertising practices, monitor print and electronic
media advertising, and issue informal opinions regarding the
propriety of particular forms of advertising and solicitation.5
3. Few areas of the law have received as much attention from the United States
Supreme Court as lawyer advertising and solicitation. The Court has issued a litany
of opinions since its landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977), in which it held that it is unconstitutional under the First Amendment for
the states to prophylactically ban truthful and non-deceptive commercial speech. See
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990);
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Obralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
4. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITIEE TO MONITOR ADVERTISING AND SOLIcrrA-
TION, 54TH ANN. REP. OF THE VA. ST. BAR, at 34 (1992).
5. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, T 10 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
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The Standing Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicita-
tion has issued several written informal advisory opinions.6
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) was amended, effective January
23, 1995, to permit an attorney to engage in live advertising. In
pertinent part, the provision now reads:
6. Examples of such advisory opinions include: A television commercial depicting
a lawyer must provide a disclaimer indicating that any actor portraying an attorney
is not an attorney associated with the law firm on whose behalf the commercial is
made. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising
Op. A-0101 (1993).
The use of the phrases "no recovery, no fee" or "you pay nothing unless we
win" are improper under DR 2-101(A) as misleading unless accompanied by an addi-
tional statement in the advertisement to the effect that the client remains responsi-
ble, in any event, for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the law firm, i.e., filing fees,
court reporter fees, expert witness fees, etc. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising
and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising Op. A-0102 (1993).
The, use of a corporate, trade or fictitious name is misleading and deceptive
under DR 2-101(A) unless the attorney or law firm actually practices under that
name. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising
Op. A-0103 (1993).
Advertisements which assert that a person injured in an accident "will have to
consult an attorney" before speaking with a representative from the insurance compa-
ny violate DR 2-101(A). While it may make good sense for an accident victim to
consult with an attorney before dealing with an insurance company, there is no legal
requirement for this, and therefore the statement is false. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer
Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising Op. A-6104 (1993).
Advertisements made on behalf of lawyer referral services or joint marketing
arrangements must measure up to the standards articulated in prior opinions issued
by the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising
and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising Op. A-0105 (1995); see, also VSB Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1543 (1993).
A lawyer or law firm may not advertise specific case results because of the
misleading nature of such communications created by the practical inability to reveal,
in advertising media, all material circumstances under which the specific result was
achieved. See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising
Op. A-0106 (1994).
A patent law firm employing lawyers admitted in various jurisdictions inquired
as to whether it could designate, on its letterhead stationery, those attorneys not
admitted in Virginia with an asterisk beside the name of each non-Virginia attorney
listed. The Committee opined that the use of an asterisk, accompanied by a footnote
"Admitted to a bar other than in Virginia" would satisfy the requirements of DR 2-
102(D). See VSB Comm. on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising
Op. A-D107 (1995).
Though truthful, a law firm's claim that "we have obtained the largest jury
verdict in the city" is inherently misleading and thus violates DR 2-101(A). See VSB
Comm. on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, Lawyer Advertising Op. A-0109
(1997).
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A public communication for which a lawyer has given value
must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the
context that it is such a communication. If such communica-
tion is disseminated to the public by use of electronic media
and is prerecorded prior to dissemination, the prerecorded
communication shall be approved by the lawyer before it is
broadcast.7
C. Administration of Attorney Trust Accounts
Disciplinary Rule 9-103(B) was amended to enhance the Vir-
ginia State Bar's (Bar) ability to monitor attorney trust ac-
counts.8 Depositary institutions managing attorney trust ac-
counts must be approved by the Bar for the receipt of trust
funds.9 To be approved, the financial institution must agree to
report overdrafts and presentments against insufficient funds."
D. Maintenance of Attorney Trust Accounts by Out-of-State
Attorneys
Attorneys practicing law in jurisdictions contiguous to Virgin-
ia have often questioned the need to maintain trust accounts in
Virginia when their law practices were outside the Common-
wealth. To accommodate the inconvenience that accompanied
the maintenance of trust accounts in more than one jurisdic-
tion, the Court amended DR 9-102 and DR 9-103, effective July
1, 1995, to permit the maintenance of a trust account in "a
state in which the lawyer maintains a law office."" The trust
accounting procedures apply to all trust accounts maintained by
lawyers who are holding funds on behalf of clients who reside
in Virginia or from a "transaction arising" in Virginia, "whether
or not the lawyer or law firm maintains an office" in Virgin-
ia.1
2
While the rule change adopted a "locus of law practice" stan-
dard, it retained three important requirements: (1) the lawyer
7. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY DR 2-101(B).
8. See id. DR 9-103.
9. See id. DR 9-103(B)(1)(a).
10. See id. DR 9-103(BX1)(b).
11. Id. DR 9-102.
12. Id. DR 9-103(B).
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is still limited to those financial institutions which agree to
notify the Bar of overdrafts and presentments against insuffi-
dent funds; (2) the lawyer must notify the financial institution
of the identity and purpose of the account; and (3) trust funds
can be maintained only in a financial institution approved by
the Bar or a depository expressly approved by the client in
writing.13 No trust account shall be maintained in any finan-
cial institution which does not agree to report to the Bar "in
the event any instrument which would be properly payable if
sufficient funds were available, is presented against attorney
trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of
whether or not the instrument is honored." 4 Any such agree-
ment shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and
shall not be canceled by the financial institution except upon
thirty days notice in writing to the Bar, or as otherwise agreed
to by the Bar. The agreement may be canceled without prior
notice by the Bar if the financial institution fails to abide by
the terms of the agreement. 5
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE PROCEDURE FOR THE INVESTIGATION
OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST ATrORNEYS
No area of lawyer regulation has experienced more change
than the procedural rules which govern the investigation and
prosecution of disciplinary complaints made against lawyers.'"
All of the rule changes were motivated by a desire to either
increase the scrutiny of lawyer conduct or improve the opera-
tion of the disciplinary system against a steady growth of com-
plaints made against lawyers in Virginia. Only the most signifi-
cant changes are outlined in this section.
A. Subcommittee Action
An important improvement in the disciplinary system was
the establishment of subcommittees, a panel of two lawyers and
13. See id. DR 9-103(B).
14. Id. DR 9-103(BX1)(b).
15. Id.
16. See VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 1 13 (Nov. Supp. 1997).
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one layperson, 7 to review the Bar's report of investigation and
to make a disposition of the complaint. Under Paragraph 13
(B)(5)(b) of Part 6 of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules, a sub-
committee of a district committee must make a disposition of
all investigations referred for further investigation by Bar coun-
sel."8 This rule change is significant because the full district
committee becomes a hearing panel only. The subcommittee can
(1) dismiss the complaint; (2) direct bar counsel to conduct fur-
ther investigation; (3) certify the matter to the disciplinary
board upon a reasonable belief that the attorney has engaged in
misconduct which, if proved, would justify a suspension or revo-
cation of the attorney's license to practice law; (4) set the mat-
ter for a hearing before the district committee; or (5) issue a
private or public reprimand, with or without terms, with the
consent of the respondent attorney and/or his or her counsel. 9
B. Reinstatement
Paragraph 13 (J) was amended to require any attorney whose
license was suspended for more than one year after July 1,
1990, to attend twelve hours of continuing legal education for
every year, or fraction thereof, that the license has been sus-
pended as a condition to reinstatement.2 ° In addition, the sus-
pended attorney must take the Multistate Professional Respon-
sibility Exam and receive an adjusted score of seventy-five or
higher.2' The prior requirements, including payment of costs
assessed by the Clerk of the Disciplinary System and reim-
bursement to the Client Protection Fund, remain in force.'
C. Agreed Dispositions
Bar counsel and the respondent can enter into an agreement
regarding the disposition of a complaint.' This agreement
17. See id. at I 13(A) (defining "Subcommittee").
18. See id. at T 13(BX5Xc)(ii).
19. See id. at 13(B)(5Xii)(a)-(e).
20. See id. at 1 13(J).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at S 13(B)(5)(b).
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must have the unanimous approval of the subcommittee. 4 Pre-
viously, all matters had to be tried in an adversarial hearing
before a district committee.
D. Appeals of Reprimands
A respondent may appeal private or public reprimands to the
disciplinary board.' The case is heard on the record developed
before the district committee." The standard of review is the
same as provided in Virginia Code section 9-6.14:17 for review
of administrative agency decisions, the "substantial evidence"
test.' Oral argument is granted unless waived by the respon-
dentY The disciplinary board may decrease, but cannot in-
crease, the severity of the sanction imposed by the district com-
mittee.' Previously, the respondent could request a redetermi-
nation of a reprimand, but the case was heard de novo, not on
the record, as is the current rule.30
E. Confidentiality
As a general rule, all matters within the disciplinary system
are confidential and exempt from discovery."' The confidentiali-
ty rule, however, now allows the Bar to inform other lawyer
regulatory agencies of on-going investigations within Virginia
and allows Bar counsel to comment, in limited ways, on inves-
tigations which are independently in the public forum.3
F. Random Review vs. Reasonable Basis for the Review of
Trust Accounts
The fiscal year of July 1, 1992 to June 30, 1993 saw a
24. See id.
25. See id. at T 13(BX1OX2).
26. See id.
27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1993); Virginia Real Estate Comm'n
v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 308 S.E.2d 123 (1983).
28. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, T 13(DX3) (Nov. Supp. 1997).
29. See id. T 13(D)(4).
30. See id. T 13(BX10).
31. See id. T 13(K)(5).
32. See id.
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groundswell of support for stricter oversight of attorneys han-
dling fiduciary funds. The fallout arising from the highly publi-
cized defalcations of David M. Murray, Sr. and James Arthur
dominated the thinking of those responsible for the regulation
of the legal profession in Virginia.' Even so, Council would
not approve a rule authorizing random audits of attorney trust
accounts. As a compromise, Paragraph 13(B)(3) was amended in
response to the demand for greater authority to review attorney
trust accounts. Key features of the rule are: (1) the Bar may
review a trust account whenever there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the account is not in compliance with the Code;
and (2) the reasonable basis must be set forth in writing by the
Bar.3
G. Cost Assessments
The Clerk of the Disciplinary System assesses costs against
the respondent attorney in misconduct matters including an
administrative fee of $300 in a case where a final determina-
tion of misconduct has been made." The Bar also may recover
reimbursement of travel and out-of-pocket expenses for witness-
es, court reporter fees and copying costs."6 In reinstatement
cases, a $1000 bond must be posted with the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and the respondent must pay whatever
costs are determined by the Board and incorporated in the
order of the supreme court granting or denying reinstate-
ment."
H. Notification of Suspension or Disbarment
Paragraph 13(K)(1) requires a disbarred or suspended attor-
ney to give notice of that fact to clients, opposing counsel and
judges.38 The rule was further amended to require the attorney
33. See REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 55TH ANN.
REP. OF THE VA. ST. BAR, at 6 (1993).
34. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, S 13(B)(3) (Nov. Supp. 1997).
35. See id. S 13(10(10).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. S 13(K)(1).
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to furnish proof of compliance to the Bar within forty-five days
of the effective date of the suspension or disbarment, indicating
that timely notice was given and arrangements made for the
disposition of client matters.39 In the absence of such proof,
the disbarred or suspended attorney is not entitled to reinstate-
ment.
40
I. Informal or Abbreviated Investigations
Effective January 13, 1997, the Supreme Court amended its
investigation procedure for complaints of ethical misconduct.4'
The amendment was deemed necessary because many com-
plaints involve minor disagreements between attorney and cli-
ent, or minor disruptions in the attorney/client relationship.
Key features of this non-traditional investigation process in-
clude: (1) the investigation is used only in instances of less
serious misconduct; (2) the goal of the investigation is to resolve
the complaint to the satisfaction of the complainant, the attor-
ney, and the Bar within ninety days from the date of filing the
complaint; and (3) if the complaint is resolved within ninety
days, it will be dismissed without becoming a part of the
attorney's disciplinary record, but if the complaint is not re-
solved within ninety days, the complaint will be processed as
any other.4"
J. Report of the Joint Legislative Audit and Review
Commission (JLARC) and Recommended Changes to the
Disciplinary System
In what some may describe as a political backlash to the
Bar's Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts Program, (IOLTA)"
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. S 13(BX5)(b).
42. See id.
43. The 1995 Session of the General Assembly passed House Bill 1970 which
"rolled back" the Bar's IOLTA Program through which the Legal Services Corporation
of Virginia (LSCV) received a significant boost in funding for legal aid to the indi-
gent. See Act of March 7, 1995, ch. 93, 1995 Va. Acts 121. The legislature made law-
yer participation in the IOLTA program optional by adding Virginia Code section
54.1-3915.1:
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the 1995 Session of the General Assembly enacted Senate Joint
Resolution 263 calling for a study of the Bar by JLARC. 4
While initially JLARC's goals and objectives were unclear, it
quickly became apparent that the Commission focused primarily
upon the disciplinary system. JLARC presented twenty-five
specific recommendations relating to the disciplinary process in
Virginia in a report to the General Assembly.45 The recommen-
dations proposed changes by statutory amendment of the Rules
of Court which govern the disciplinary process and changes in
the internal operating procedures of the Office of Bar Counsel.
The Bar's Standing Committee on Lawyer Discipline (COLD)
studied JLARC's recommendations and the Council and the Su-
preme Court of Virginia acted upon some of these recommenda-
tions. As a result of JLARC's recommendations, the Bar: (1)
implemented a written policy requiring Bar counsel to docu-
ment in writing every decision to dismiss a complaint at the
intake level or after preliminary investigation; (2) adopted a
written internal procedure affording the complainant an oppor-
tunity to rebut the accused attorney's response to the complaint
prior to any decision by Bar counsel to dismiss or refer the
complaint to a district committee; (3) obtained the supreme
court's approval to amend the rules regarding investigation to
require lay member participation on any district committee or
disciplinary board panel taking action in a disciplinary case;
The Supreme Court shall not promulgate any disciplinary rules, rule or
regulation requiring that attorneys or law firms deposit client funds in
interest-bearing accounts, pooled or otherwise, on which the interest is
required to be paid to any person or entity other than the client. Any
disciplinary rule, rule or regulation previously promulgated which is in-
consistent with this section is void and of no effect.
The Supreme Court of Virginia was compelled to amend the Rules of Court to pro-
vide that attorneys could "opt out" of the IOLTA program, leaving the attorney with
the option of placing trust funds in a non-interest bearing fiduciary account, or an ac-
count drawing interest except that any interest earned had to be paid to the client.
See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 1 20 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
44. See S.J. Res. 263, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1995).
45. See JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE VIR-
GINIA STATE BAR, S. Doc. No. 15 (1996).
46. Paragraph 13(B)(2) and (C) were amended to require that a non-lawyer mem-
ber be scheduled to participate in every hearing before a district committee or the
disciplinary board. However, if the non-lawyer member was unexpectedly unable to
participate and a substitute could not be located, the trial would nevertheless proceed
so long as a quorum was otherwise present. See VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, T
13(BX2Xd), (C)(2) (Nov. Supp. 1997).
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(4) implemented a study to examine the consistency of decisions
and sanctions imposed by the district committees throughout
the state; (5) successfully petitioned the General Assembly to
provide qualified immunity for complainants; 7 (6) obtained the
supreme court's approval to amend the rules to prohibit, any
member of Council, COLD, the disciplinary board, and the dis-
trict committees from representing a respondent at any point in
the disciplinary system; (7) obtained the supreme court's ap-
proval to amend the rules to prohibit committee members who
participate in the subcommittee's review of a case from sitting
on the committee panel that ultimately hears the case;49 and
(8) obtained the supreme court's approval to amend the rules
allowing a respondent to request a hearing before a committee
panel for any dismissal that creates a disciplinary record.0
HI. LEGAL ETHICS OPINIONS"'
A. Ancillary Businesses
Lawyers who form lay corporations to provide arbitration and
mediation services to customers of the corporation are not en-
gaged in the practice of law and, therefore, not all of the provi-
sions of the Code apply.52 For example, the prohibition against
splitting fees with a non-lawyer under DR 3-102' does not
apply unless the lawyer/mediator performs legal services beyond
the role of a scrivener of the parties' memorandum of agree-
47. Section 54.1-3908 of the Virginia Code was amended in 1996 to read:
No person shall be held liable in any civil action for words written or
spoken in any complaint regarding, proceeding concerning, or investiga-
tion of, the professional conduct of any member of the Virginia State
Bar, unless it is shown that such statements were false and were made
willfully and maliciously.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3908 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
48. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 13(K)(9Xa) (Nov. Supp. 1997).
49. See id. at I 13(BX5)-(6).
50. See id.
51. The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics (Committee) is authorized to issue
written advisory opinions, pursuant to a request made by a member of the bar. See
VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 10 (Repl. Vol. 1997). The opinions of the Committee
are informal and not binding on any court or tribunal unless approved by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. See id. at T 10 (C)(VI).
52. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1368 (1990).
53. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102 (1983).
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ment in the mediation process.54 However, the attorney/media-
tor must comply with DR 5-101(A)55 by disclosing his or her
ownership interest in the corporation to the parties.56
It is not unethical per se for a law firm to develop an ancil-
lary business to complement the legal services provided by the
firm." As a result, the ancillary business may send its clients
to the law firm, and the law firm may send its clients to the
ancillary business.58
B. Conflicts
1. Financial Interests
The Standing Committee on Legal Ethics (Committee) ad-
dressed the propriety of an attorney drafting an instrument
which names the attorney as personal representative or trustee,
or which directs such other designee to employ the attorney as
fiduciary administrator.59 In a broad-sweeping opinion affecting
estate planners, the Committee addressed the conflicts which
arise when an attorney or his or her law firm provides services
to the testator or the testator's estate, beyond the preparation
of the will or trust instrument.0
There need not be a prior attorney/client relationship for the
attorney to be named as executor or trustee under the testa-
mentary document. However, the attorney should be mindful of
the appearance of overreaching and not consciously influence a
client to name him as executor or trustee in an instrument.6'
The naming of the executor or trustee must be an informed and
fully volitional act of the client."
54. See LEO 1368.
55. See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A).
56. See LEO 1368.
57. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1658 (1995) (law firm han-
dling labor and employment law litigation owns and operates consulting firm special-
izing in human resources and behavioral science to which it refers clients).
58. See id.
59. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1515 (1994).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
1126
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
As executor, trustee or attorney for the estate, the attorney
must disclose the attorney's potential fees." The Committee
recommended that the fee disclosure be reduced to writing, and
established the attorney's duty to recommend to the client that
he or she investigate the fees of others who would provide simi-
lar services.'
When the attorney named as executor or trustee intends to,
or is considering, retaining his or her law firm as attorney for
the estate or trust, the attorney must disclose that intention to
the testator/grantor and obtain their consent prior to the execu-
tion of the will or trust.' The attorney acting as a fiduciary is
subject to the constraints of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.6
The Supreme Court of Virginia approved the Committee's
opinion, effective February 1, 1994, making it a decision of the
supreme court. 7
2. Multiple Parties
a. Simultaneous Representation Requiring Withdrawal
Attorney 1 represented Defendant A and Attorney 2 repre-
sented Defendant B in separate capital murder trials on the
same case. Defendants A and B were each found guilty and
sentenced to death. Thereafter, Attorney 1 was assigned to
represent Defendant B in a habeas petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, and Attorney 2 was similarly appointed to
represent Defendant A."
The Committee analyzed this dilemma in light of DR 5-
101(A) and concluded that, with client consent after full and
adequate disclosure, the conflict is curable.69
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 9 10(gXv) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
68. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1665 (1996).
69. See id.
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b. Is Consent to a Conflict Revocable?
An attorney agreed to represent client H on charges of driv-
ing under the influence while representing client W in contempt
proceedings against client H for child support arrearages. Client
H recognized the existence of a conflict of interest, and signed a
waiver stating that he had no objection to the attorney continu-
ing to represent client W in the contempt proceedings. Client H
also agreed orally not to object to the attorney's continued rep-
resentation of client W. Subsequently, client H revoked his
waiver and objected to the attorney's continued representation
of client W.70
Notwithstanding the written waiver and the oral representa-
tions of client H, the Committee initially observed, "[c]onsent is
not a contractual obligation. Client consent may be withdrawn
at any time."7'
Upon further reflection, the Committee reconsidered the issue
and changed its position. An attorney must withdraw from
representation only if the consent is withdrawn "under certain
circumstances."" The Committee considered such factors as
whether there was a substantial relationship between the cur-
rent and former representation, and whether one could reason-
ably argue that the attorney learned confidential information in
the earlier representation that could be used improperly in the
current representation."3
C. Fees
1. Fees for the Collection of Medical Expense Payments
A lawyer inquired which of the following methods of payment
would be appropriate for the recovery of Med Pay: (1) an ad-
ministrative fee of ten percent of any medical expense proceeds
70. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1652 (1995) (reconsidered
and revised July 8, 1996).
71. Id. (citing VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1354; Commercial &
Say. Bank v. Brundige, 5 Va. Cir. 33, 34 (Winchester City 1981)).
72. Id.
73. See id.
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collected by the attorney for the client; (2) a flat fee based on
the actual estimated cost of having a paralegal assist the client;
or (3) an hourly fee based on the paralegal's standard hourly
rate of sixty-five dollars.74
The Committee opined that the percentage-based administra-
tive fee was clearly improper because it was similar to a contin-
gency fee. For a contingency fee to be proper, there must be
some risk of not collecting it. The Committee concluded,
however, that the flat fee and the hourly fee were not per se
improper.75
In a subsequent opinion, the committee considered whether
an attorney could ethically charge a contingency fee for the
recovery of medical payments against the tortfeasor's insurance
carrier, noting that the contingency fee is improper where col-
lection is ministerial in nature and payment is automatic. The
Committee determined that since the client's entitlement to
medical expense reimbursement was contested by the
tortfeasor's carrier, it was not improper to charge a contingency
fee for the recovery of medical expenses.76
2. Value Billing
A law firm proposed an arrangement whereby clients were
classified in categories for the attorney who originated the work
and those attorneys who actually did the work. The question
presented was whether it was proper to bill additional amounts
to the client for "administrative fees," "processing fees," or
"value billing" (a fixed "percentage add on from 20% to 200%"
at the originating attorney's hourly rate) when the originating
attorney does not actually work on the case.77 Under this ar-
rangement, the client would not be informed of the fee markup.
In the absence of advance client knowledge and consent, the
74. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1641 (1995); see also VSB
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1461 (1992); Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P.2d
260, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); The Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So.2d 145, 148 (Fla.
1975).
75. See LEO 1641.
76. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1696 (1997).
77. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1648 (1995).
1997] 1129
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1115
Committee determined that such billing practices would be un-
ethical."8
3. Collection Fee
An attorney proposed to have his clients sign a retainer
agreement which provided, among other things, that if the
attorney had to sue the client for any unpaid fees, the client
would pay a $500 collection fee.79 Pointing out that a fee
agreement between an attorney and a client is "in a classifica-
tion peculiar to itself' and-is "permeated with the paramount
relationship of attorney and client,"0 the Committee concluded
that the contract would violate the mandate of DR 2-105(A).8 1
4. Charging Fee to Pro Bono Client
The Committee addressed the question of whether an attor-
ney who received a pro bono client by referral from a legal aid
office could subsequently charge, and receive, a fee. 2 At issue
was whether such conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4) which states
that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on a
lawyer's fitness to practice law."'
The Committee also considered EC 2-27, which urges all law-
yers, to "find time to participate in serving the disadvan-
taged." 4 The Committee held:
For an attorney to agree to receive cases on a pro bono
basis from Legal Aid and then, with no notice to the Legal
Aid Society, to extract a fee from the referred client is a
clear misrepresentation regarding the attorney's fulfillment
of the Society/attorney referral agreement. The committee
78. See id.
79. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1667 (1996).
80. Id. (citing Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 962-63, 234
S.E.2d 282, 285 (1977)).
81. See i&; VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBILITY DR 2-105(A) ("A lawyer's
fees shall be reasonable and adequately explained to the client.").
82. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1691 (1996).
83. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIILY DR 1-102(AX4).
84. See id. EC 2-27.
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opines that, due to the importance of the availability of free
legal services to the public, the misrepresentation by the
attorney does constitute a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).' 5
D. Confidences and Secrets
1. Duty to Reveal Former Client's Misrepresentation
An attorney completed a divorce for a client and the client
subsequently filed for bankruptcy. The client listed the attorney
as a creditor, but did not list a number of assets owned by the
client which were included in the property settlement agree-
ment incorporated into the final divorce decree."
Notwithstanding the fact that the final decree, and, therefore,
the property settlement agreement, were public documents, the
Committee concluded that the attorney could not reveal the
client's fraud. 7 The information regarding the assets was a
"secret" protected by DR 4-101(A).' The Committee also con-
cluded that the attorney could not report the former client's
fraud on the bankruptcy court under DR 4-101(D)(2) since the
fraud did not occur "in the course of the relationship." 9
2. Duty To Protect Client Confidences and Secrets
A client engaged counsel for assistance in a wrongful dis-
charge claim against her former employer. The discharged em-
ployee received, from a friend still working at the company, a
copy of a letter from the company's counsel to company man-
agement which addressed the wrongful discharge claim." The
employee then gave the copy of the letter to her lawyer and re-
quested that the lawyer destroy it.91 The client feared that her
85. LEO 1691.
86. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1643 (1995).
87. See id.
88. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmTY DR 4-101(A).
89. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1643 (1995); see VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmIIY DR 4-101(DX2).
90. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1688 (1996).
91. See id.
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former employer would take retaliatory action against her
friend.92
The Committee was faced with a number of interesting ques-
tions. Is the existence of the letter a client confidence or secret?
Does the duty of zealous representation require that the attor-
ney review the contents of the letter? Is there anything about
the letter which must be revealed to the opposing counsel? May
the lawyer destroy the letter? Does the attorney have a duty to
withdraw from the representation? Does the attorney/client
privilege apply?
The Committee opined that the circumstance under which the
lawyer received the letter is a secret.93 No duty of zealous rep-
resentation required the lawyer to read the letter. Since the
information is protected as a client secret, the attorney must
comply with the client's wishes, including destroying the letter,
and may not reveal anything about the letter to opposing coun-
sel.' Further, since the attorney had no role in the procure-
ment of the letter, he is not required to withdraw from the
representation.95 If a discovery request is filed with the attor-
ney, he should file an objection.95
E. Trial Conduct
1. What Does One Do Upon Learning That the Plaintiffs
Expert Lied?
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) requires a lawyer who receives
information clearly establishing that someone other than his
client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal to promptly
reveal the fraud to the tribunal.97 Therefore, defense counsel,
upon learning that the plaintiffs expert witness lied about his
qualifications in his deposition, must reveal the fraud to the
tribunal. 98
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(BX1).
98. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1650 (1995).
1132
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
2. Contact with Former Employee of Adverse Party
The Committee was asked to consider the propriety of de-
fense counsel communicating ex parte with a former employee
of the plaintiff corporation, regarding the employee's recollec-
tions concerning matters at issue in a pending law suit." At
issue was whether DR 7-103(A)(1)co prohibited defense
counsel's contact with the former employee since the corporation
was represented by counsel. 1' Even though a former employee
is a member of the control group,0 2 once the employee sepa-
rates from the corporation, the restrictions upon direct contact
cease to exist because the former employee no longer speaks for
the corporation or binds it by his or her actions or admis-
sions."°s
3. Interference with Opposing Party's Expert Witness
May defense counsel employ the senior member of the medi-
cal practice group as an expert witness if the plaintiff's previ-
ously designated expert was also a member of the same prac-
tice group? Does counsel for the defendant have a duty to in-
struct his expert not to communicate with the plaintiff's expert
about the case? In this scenario presented to the Committee,
the senior doctor advised the younger doctor to reconsider his
decision to serve as an expert for the plaintiff.'O° The Commit-
tee concluded that the answers depended on motivation. It is
99. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1670 (1996).
100. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIY DR 7-103(A).
101. See LEO 1670.
102. The Committee has adopted the "control group" test employed in Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), to define those management-level employees
that opposing counsel may not contact without permission from the corporation's at-
torney. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1504 (1992) (not improper
for attorney to directly contact or interview employees of an adverse party provided
such employees are not members of the corporation's "control group"). But see
Queensberry v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 157 F.R.D. 21 (E.D. Va. 1993) (applying DR 7-
103(AXlYs prohibition against ex parte contacts with employees of adverse party even
if employee is not a member of the "control group" where activities or statements of
employee are part of the focus of litigation or would make employer vicariously lia-
ble).
103. See LEO 1670.
104. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1678 (1996).
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not ethically permissible for a lawyer to directly advise the
other party's expert witness not to testify, or to cause the other
party's witness not to testify indirectly through another acting
at the lawyer's request. If defense counsel did in fact employ
his expert merely to harass or injure the plaintiff by subverting
plaintiffs employment of his expert, such conduct would violate
DR 7-102(A)(1). 10 5 However, two physicians in the same prac-
tice group may serve as expert witnesses in the same litigation
without presenting an ethics issue."
F. Surreptitious Tape Recordings
The Committee, having previously determined that suggesting
secret tape recording to a client was unethical,"7 encountered
the same issue in the context of a wrongful discharge case."
An attorney/officer of a corporation secretly recorded a tele-
phone conversation with a discharged employee who was in-
volved in a dispute with the company over the termination of
his employment."9 The recorded telephone conversation was
between the former employee and the attorney/officer, who did
not indicate that he was acting as the attorney for the corpora-
tion even though the former employee knew that the officer was
also an attorney."' Even though the attorney later admitted
to the former employee's counsel that he taped the conversation
and the tape was produced in response to a discovery request,
the Committee determined that the attorney's conduct in secret-
ly recording the former employee's conversation was improper
and violated DR 1-102(A)(4)."'
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1448 (1992). The Commit-
tee relied on the holding of Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d
597 (1989), that the surreptitious recording of the wife's telephone conversations with
third parties, at the direction -of husband's lawyer, to which husband's lawyer was not
a party, and without the consent or knowledge of the wife and such third parties,
was conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit under DR 1-102(AX4). See Gunter,
238 Va. at 622, 385 S.E.2d at 600.
108. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1635 (1995).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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G. Duty to Report Misconduct
DR 1-103(A) requires an attorney to report misconduct which
raises a substantial question as to an attorney's fitness to prac-
tice law." Should an attorney report alleged misconduct of
opposing counsel in an ongoing civil matter? The Committee
once again addressed the tension between the duty to report
misconduct and the admonition to refrain from filing a disci-
plinary complaint solely to obtain an advantage in a civil mat-
ter."' While the Committee did not develop a "bright line"
rule for reporting, the Committee stated that a good faith in-
tent to discharge one's responsibility under DR 1-103 could not
be viewed as a filing "solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter.""
4
IV. DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS AND RELATED COURT CASES
A. Attorney-Client Relationship
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) prohibits a lawyer, in the represen-
tation of a client, from knowingly advancing a claim that is
unwarranted under existing law."5 The Disciplinary Board
(Board) found that an attorney violated DR 7-102(A) while
representing himself pro se." 6
In another case, an attorney was appointed as a hearing
officer under Virginia Code section 9-6.14:12 to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law in a matter before the Virginia
Real Estate Board and then file his report within ten days after
the hearing."7 The hearing occurred on February 17, 1993,
but, as of December 16, 1994, the respondent had not filed the
report."' The Disciplinary Board held that, for purposes of ap-
plying DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 6-101(B) and (C), the Depart-
112. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBITY DR 1-103(A).
113. See id. DR 7-104(A).
114. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1646 (1995).
115. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBmlTY DR 7-102(A).
116. See In re Edward Falcon Hodges, No. 93-090-1550 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
117. See In re Mark William Rossi, No. 94-032-1074 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
118. See id.
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ment of Professional Occupation and Regulation employed the
respondent to conduct a hearing on behalf of the Real Estate
Board and the "Board" was his client."'
B. Concealment; Duty to Third Persons and the Court
A Commonwealth's Attorney concealed from the victim of a
sexual assault and the sentencing judge material aspects of an
accord and satisfaction reached between the prosecutor and
defense counsel, including the fact that some of the money
offered by the defense would be the subject of charitable contri-
butions to particular entities on the prosecutor's behalf.1" The
court found that concealment designed to mislead another is
conduct involving fraud, dishonesty or deceit under DR 1-
102(A)(4). 2' An attorney's duty not to practice deceit or mis-
representation is not confined to dealings with his clients; it
also extends to others who may be adversely affected by such
conduct." s A prosecutor is required to inform the sentencing
judge if the Commonwealth requires charitable contributions
from the accused persons or their families as a condition to a
plea agreement."
C. Reinstatement Cases
The Board has found that "[r]einstatement hearings present
the Board with one of its most difficult tasks and must be ap-
proached on a case by case basis."" The Board considers nu-
merous factors in determining whether to recommend reinstate-
ment to the Court." In recent years, the Board seems to
119. See id.
120. See Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar, 248 Va 334, 339, 448 S.E.2d 615, 618
(1994).
121. See id. at 340, 448 S.E.2d at 618.
122. See id. at 340, 448 S.E.2d at 619.
123. See id. at 340, 448 S.E.2d at 619-20.
124. In re Alfred L. Hiss, No. 83-26 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1984).
125. Among the factors considered by the Disciplinary Board in reinstatement
cases are:
a. the severity of the misconduct, including the nature and circumstances sur-
rounding the misconduct;
b. the attorney's character, maturity and experience at the time of disbarment;
c. the time elapsed since the attorney's disbarment;
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have held respondents to a higher standard and threshold of
proof in applications for reinstatement.
A lawyer surrendered his license in 1986, having entered
guilty pleas to conspiracy to file, and filing, a false loan state-
ment with a federal agency-a felony.' He served time in a
federal prison camp for about eighteen months. In his reinstate-
ment hearing the Board found that the lawyer led educational
and religious programs for inmates while in prison, repaid fines
and restitution as circumstances permitted, enjoyed good stand-
ing in his community, was active in volunteer programs, kept
current with the law, and no adverse impact on the public's
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession would occur if
reinstatement were allowed.'
A commonwealth's attorney was convicted of cocaine posses-
sion and admitted to a cocaine addiction of three to four years
while serving as Commonwealth's Attorney." The Board con-
sidered evidence related to the underlying conviction and noted:
In the instant case,... we have evidence that the
Commonwealth's Attorney (not an assistant), while in the
process of buying cocaine from an undercover agent who
was posing as a prospective client, said: "Give me some-
thing now (expletive). If you dont... rm gonna put you
in jail, and 11 keep putting you in jail .... Just don't ever
put me in a jam, hear? I might be the last (expletive) you
need, you remember that."'
d. restitution to clients and the Bar;
e. the attorney's activities since disbarment, including his conduct and attitude
during the period of disbarment;
f. the attorney's present reputation and standing in the community;
g. the attorney's familiarity with the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and his current proficiency in the law;
h. the sufficiency of the punishment undergone by the attorney;
i. the attorney's sincerity, frankness and truthfulness in presenting and discuss-
ing factors relating to the disbarment and reinstatement;
j. the impact upon public confidence in the administration of justice if the
attorney's license to practice law was restored.
See id.
126. In re Scott Meadows Reed, No. 92-000-1495 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1993).
127. See id.
128. See In re Lynn Curtis Brownley, No. 94-000-2192 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
129. Id.
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The Board recommended that the former prosecutor not be
reinstated and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his peti-
tion.
3 0
In another drug-related case, a lawyer was convicted of con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to defraud the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS). By a vote of 3-2, the Disciplinary
Board recommended the reinstatement of respondent's license to
practice law.' The Bar filed exceptions with the Supreme
Court of Virginia, and the lawyer's petition was ultimately
denied.'32
A former immigration hearing officer applied to the Board for
reinstatement. Since he had certified petitions for citizenship
containing false information and had immigrant workers per-
form labor at his residence, the officer was convicted of federal
conspiracy, giving false statements to a federal agency, and re-
ceipt of illegal gratuities." His petition for readmission was
denied."
D. Sanctions-Aggravation
On charges of neglect, failure to communicate and incompe-
tence in the handling of an appeal in a divorce matter, the
Board found Edward Hodges violated DR 6-101(A), (B), (C) and
(D). 5 When the Board learned of Hodges' prior disciplinary
record, which revealed a pattern of inexcusable neglect in the
handling of clients' matters, it stated:
It is, therefore, the opinion of the Board that the accumula-
tion of repeated violations of the disciplinary rules must be
taken into account. The express purpose of lawyer disciplin-
ary proceedings is to protect the public and the administra-
tion of justice from lawyers who continually fail to properly
discharge their professional responsibilities to their clients,
the public at large and the legal profession. Considering the
number of prior offenses and the apparent inability or un-
130. See id.
131. See In re J. Murray Hooker, II, No. 94-000-0470 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
132. See id.
133. See In re Ira Steven Krup, No. 94-000-1436 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
134. See id.
135. See In re Edward Falcon Hodges, No. 93-090-1469 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1995).
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willingness of the Respondent to correct these continuing
deficiencies, the Board is of the opinion that the
Respondent's license to practice law should be suspended for
three (3) years. 8"
Over the years, the Board has imposed severe penalties,
typically a long suspension or a revocation, where the respon-
dent attorney's prior disciplinary record has demonstrated an
unacceptable pattern of neglect or inattention to client mat-
ters."' Repetitive behavior, multiple offenses, and a pattern of
misconduct over a considerable period of time are aggravating
factors and properly affect the degree of discipline to be im-
posed."
E. Misappropriation of Funds
In a show cause proceeding upon a criminal conviction, revo-
cation resulted from violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-
102(A)(4) where respondent, a private operating trustee in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, committed the following acts starting in
1988: engaging in a scheme to defraud creditors, the Bankrupt-
cy Court and the United States Trustee; engaging in a scheme
to embezzle and convert money from the bankruptcy estate for
his own personal use; and submitting a fraudulent Trustee's
Final Report to the United States Trustee which did not dis-
close the money he had previously embezzled and converted.3 9
Once the embezzlements had been discovered in 1994, respon-
dent then tried to demonstrate that he was entitled to the
embezzled monies by submitting to the United States Trustee a
fraudulent "client billing worksheet."'
Respondent was unable to meet his burden to show cause
why his law license should not be revoked, despite arguing an
136. Id.
137. See generally In re Charles Edward Mann, No. 93-010-0213, 93-010-1218 (VSB
Disc. Bd. 1994) (four-year suspension); In re Ronald Lee Smallwood, No. 92-033-1816,
93-033-0321 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994) (revocation).
138. See Tucker v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 526, 533, 357 S.E.2d 525, 529
(1987).
139. See In re Joseph Francis Manson, III, No. 94-052-2201 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1997).
140. See id-
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honest reputation, lack of dishonest or selfish motive, and lack
of a prior record.'
F. Trustworthiness
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) provides that an attorney shall
not commit a crime or other deliberately wrongful act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.'
The Board had an opportunity to consider this disciplinary rule
in light of allegations involving a pattern of lying and deceit by
an attorney.' The Board found that the attorney had en-
gaged in a consistent pattern of lying to his clients, to his law
practice mentor, and to the Bar.'" Since one of the fundamen-
tals of the legal profession is the integrity and trustworthiness
of its members, the Board concluded that a light sanction was
inappropriate for an attorney who consistently engaged in lying
and imposed a three-year suspension"
G. Self-Dealing
The Board revoked the license of William J. Powell to prac-
tice law in a case which prompted the Board to note, "[sleldom
have we seen such an egregious pattern of self-dealing on the
part of a Virginia lawyer at the expense of an enfeebled cli-
ent."'4
Powell met Ronald Kirby, who was eighty-three years old and
physically, mentally and emotionally impaired, through Ellen
Long, a friend of Powell's. 47 Powell took control of Kirby's
$1,700,000 in assets, and rewrote Kirby's will, leaving half of
the estate to Ellen Long.'" Powell prepared an unsecured
note for $365,000, gave it to Kirby, and used the funds to re-
convert Powell's Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a Chapter 11 bank-
141. See id.
142. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(AX3).
143. See In re Daniel Wood Aldredge, No. 94-033-2151 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1995).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. In re William J. Powell, No. 93-041-1723 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1995).
147. See id.
148. See id.
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ruptcy. Powell then prepared a letter for signature by Kirby,
forgiving the $365,000 note. 49  Powell also paid himself
$300,000 in legal fees to administer Kirby's assets.15
H. Threatening Criminal or Disciplinary Action to Obtain a
Civil Advantage
When representing the heir of an estate, an attorney wrote
another heir to request the return of some estate property. The
attorney went beyond the limits of appropriate communication,
however, when he advised the addressee that he (the attorney)
would "seek felony embezzlement, fraud, grand larceny and
forgery capital warrants against both of them pursuant to stat-
utory mandate" unless the property was returned. 5'
In another complaint, the same attorney threatened to bring
disciplinary charges against a second attorney, noting how close
the second attorney's office was to the offices of the Virginia
State Bar,'52 a clear violation of DR 7-104."5 The attorney
was given a public reprimand with regard to both viola-
tions."5
In the case of In re Sa'ad El-Amin,55 the Respondent, on
behalf of his clients, wrote to another attorney advising that a
financial settlement of his clients' claims would forestall the
filing of a lawsuit and a complaint with the Bar."5 By agreed
disposition, the Board imposed an admonition, finding a viola-
tion of DR 7-104(A).5 7
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. In re George Albert Bates, Nos. 94-070-2414 and 95-070-2396 (7th Dist
Subcom. 1996).
152. See id.
153. See id.; VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-104 ("A lawyer shall
not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.").
154. See In re Bates, Nos. 94-070-2414 and 95-070-2396 (7th Dist. Subcom. 1996).
155. No. 93-032-0694 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1994).
156. See id.
157. See id.
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I. Communication with Clients
With regard to a scheduled hearing of a driving while intoxi-
cated charge in the Fairfax County General District Court, an
attorney: (1) failed to contact or otherwise consult with the
client until the day before trial; (2) sent an inexperienced and
unprepared associate to try the case; (3) made no arrangements
for the appearance of the client's witnesses at trial; (4) failed to
advise the client that the attorney had a scheduling conflict
with the trial date; and (5) made no arrangements for a contin-
uance. 5 ' This lapse of communication and inactivity violated
DR 6-101(B) and (C). A public reprimand with terms was im-
posed.'59
J. Mitigation
In the case of In re David Jerome Allmond,'" the Board
considered a series of cases involving neglect, misrepresenta-
tion, failure to communicate adequately with the client, and
failure to properly account for client funds. In deciding an
appropriate sanction, the Board considered the following circum-
stances: (1) the misconduct arose while the attorney was addict-
ed to cocaine; (2) the attorney was committed to a two-year
aftercare contract with the William J. Farley Institute, which
required random urine testing, group therapy sessions, and
meetings; (3) the attorney had not used any addictive substanc-
es, including alcohol, since June 1994, and (4) had complied
with all terms and conditions imposed by the Farley Insti-
tute.
16
The Board imposed a three-year suspension. Additionally, the
attorney must successfully complete all terms and conditions of
probation, and the attorney shall complete all terms and condi-
tions of the two-year aftercare contract.6 2
158. See In re Mark Thomas Crossland, No. 95-053-0770 (5th Dist. Comm. 1995).
159. See id.
160. No. 94-010-0309 (VSB Disc. Ed. 1995).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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K. Reciprocal Discipline
An attorney whose license was suspended in California for
two years for a neglect matter was ultimately disbarred in
California for not complying with that state's probation require-
ments." The question for the Board was whether disbarment
was an appropriate sanction in Virginia. The Board concluded
that the attorney's original misconduct, coupled with his refusal
to comply with the requirements of the California Supreme
Court, warranted a lesser sanction than disbarment and im-
posed a ninety-day suspension."
L. Trying Case While Suspended for Failure to Pay Bar Dues
Respondent represented his client at trial of a civil case and
at a subsequent hearing two months later knowing that his law
license had already been suspended. However, Respondent
failed to inform the presiding judge, opposing counsel, or his
client of his suspension and admitted his knowledge only after
confronted with the matter at the second hearing." The
Board found violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 2-108(A)(1)
and suspended the attorney for thirty days."
M. No Trust Account for Fear of IRS Lien
Respondent fell behind in payments to the IRS on an arrear-
age which resulted in the IRS filing liens against respondent's
accounts including his trust account."' The lien against the
trust account was quickly released. When an IRS agent told the
respondent that a lien would again be placed on the trust ac-
count if he fell behind in his payments, the respondent decided
it would be too risky to continue maintaining a trust account
and closed it."
163. See In re Alan Jay Cilman, No. 95-000-1299 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1995).
164. See id.
165. See In re Stephen Hayden Mims, VSB Docket No. 96-021-1669 (VSB Disc. Bd.
1996).
166. See id.
167. See In re Martin Donelson, I, No. 96-090-1165 (VSB Disc. Bd. 1997).
168. See id.
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Trust account violations were based upon, among other
things, the fact that when respondent received unearned fees,
he placed some of the funds in his personal checking account
and received the balance as cash instead of depositing said
funds into a trust account as required.'69 By agreement, re-
spondent received a six-month suspension followed by a one-
year probationary period. 7'
N. Failure to Honor Subpoena Duces Tecum and Summons of
District Committee
Respondent was personally served with a subpoena duces
tecum to bring certain trust account records to a district com-
mittee meeting thirty minutes prior to a hearing on the case,
but failed to do so." A summons was also personally served
requiring respondent's appearance before the district committee
at a designated time for the hearing on the same complaint.
Respondent failed to appear at the designated time although
his counsel appeared for the case. 2 The district committee
found violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 7-105(A) as a result
of a new complaint filed on the basis of the failure to honor the
process of the district committee.'
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See In re James L. Tucker, No. 95-101-0701, (10th Dist. Comm. 1996).
172. See id.
173. See id.
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